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The focus of this research is what might be thought of as Colombia’s official culture of anti-racism, a term that seems decidedly out of place in a country where racism continues to be such an obvious everyday 
reality. Yet in some ways it is an apposite categorisation. After all, Colombia is a 
country in which the constitutional recognition of the rights of Afrocolombian 
and indigenous communities has led to nearly a third of the national territory 
being assigned to the jurisdiction of the traditional authorities of these minority 
groups (Paschel, 2016b, p. 57). An anti-discrimination law focusing particularly 
on racism, passed in 2011, the International Year of Afrodescendants, allows 
for the imprisonment of offenders for up to three years. State and municipal 
institutions have programmes emphasising the need for ‘inclusion’, a rather 
nebulous term, to be sure, but nonetheless one which implies the need to 
recognise the rights of minorities and promote their representation in public 
life. The manuales de convivencia that exist in all of Colombia’s schools, both 
public and private, contain sections promoting tolerance and respect for ethnic 
or racial minorities. In short, the political and juridical foundations of the 
Colombian state enshrine the principle of equal rights and equal status of 
minority groups in a pluriethnic and multicultural state.
This framework has been shored up by other forms of official recognition. The 
designation of 21 May as the day of afrocolombianidad, albeit a rather weak move 
in a country where most days seem to have some profession or group attached 
to them, has been followed by official anti-racist programmes such as the Hora 
contra el racismo [Hour against Racism] and Ponga la cara al racismo [Face up 
to Racism], which have in turn been framed within the Afro Decade campaign 
launched by the ministry of the interior as part of a UN initiative. With its 
slogan ‘Recognition, Justice and Development 2015–24’, the programme aims 
at ‘making visible the rights of Afrocolombians’, a form of words that reworks the 
longstanding complaint about Afrocolombians’ lack of visibility on the national 
stage in order to focus on the need to respect the rights they have already been 
afforded under the constitution and subsequent legislation.
This content downloaded from 128.240.225.52 on Wed, 04 Mar 2020 13:22:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
CULTURES OF ANTI-RACISM26
The national media appear to have accepted and amplified these measures. 
Indeed, for some time now, casual everyday racism has been increasingly 
subject to critique in the public space created by the media. In 2012, Bogotá 
city councillor Jorge Durán Silva was forced into a humiliating apology after 
describing a rowdy meeting as a ‘blacks’ tea party’, while in 2015, Caracol 
TV, one of Colombia’s two main private TV channels was forced to retire the 
polemical blackface character, Soldado Micolta, played by mestizo comedian 
Roberto Lozano, from the popular comedy show Sábados Felices, after a 
complaint by the activist group Chao Racismo. 
Most recently, Maurice Armitage, the mayor of Cali, a city with a large 
Afrocolombian population, found himself at the centre of a media storm 
for the racist tenor of comments made during an interview with TV news 
programme CM&, in which he linked football violence to the civic strike in 
the nearby port of Buenaventura, on the overwhelmingly black Pacific coast. 
His claim that Cali was ‘an explosive city’ where ‘we have a million blacks and 
live with them in peace, we love them a lot but we have to be careful with this 
kind of violence’, as a prime example of the ‘othering’ of the black population, 
while associating it unequivocally with violence (El Espectador, 2017). What 
made this statement even more embarrassing was that Ray Charrupí, president 
of Chao Racismo, had been taken on as a consultant by Armitage in an 
attempt to deal with the city’s endemic racism, which has received increasing 
media attention in recent years. To make matters still worse, Armitage’s 
administration had only just denounced caleño journalist Daniel Vivas’s racist 
Twitter feed denigrating the annual Petronio Álvarez festival celebrating music 
from the Pacific littoral. ‘What’s that smell of shit?’, tweeted Vivas. ‘Ah, yes, the 
Petronio Álvarez has started’ (Aldía, 2017). The tweet was promptly deleted, 
but a deluge of outrage ensued. Vivas’s equally racist blog was removed by El 
Tiempo (2017), Colombia’s main daily, after complaints by readers, leading to 
the editorial team issuing a statement noting that ‘this newspaper reiterates its 
respect and admiration for the country’s cultural traditions, which enhance its 
ethnic diversity and construct a pluralist and democratic identity’. 
The public outcry, steered and editorialised by the media, exemplifies the 
everyday dynamics of an official or mainstream anti-racism, an assemblage of 
institutional arrangements and discourses, which has found an echo in the 
mainstream networks of cultural exchange. The political consequences of this 
nexus, whose emergence is the fruit of a long and arduous struggle by anti-
racist activists within the Afrocolombian and indigenous population, as well 
as the adoption of anti-racist discourses by international institutions such as 
the World Bank, have been significant since its establishment through the 
constitution of 1991. Most strikingly, the disavowal of racism, once the default 
position of national institutions, has been replaced by an acceptance of its 
prevalence, alongside a blanket condemnation of all discriminatory practices.
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Of course, not only do these examples themselves reveal the casual racism 
that continues to disfigure everyday life in Colombia but even at the moment 
of condemnation both the media and institutions frequently reproduce 
racist tropes. Institutions, after all, are made up of people, many of whom 
unreflectingly share commonly held racist assumptions. At the very least, 
stereotypical ways of thinking about race continue to make their appearance 
in public campaigns, exemplified by an anti-racist campaign organised in 2015 
by the local administration in Bogotá. It showed the figure of an indigenous 
woman anchored by the slogan ‘Don’t discriminate, I’m in your blood’, in the 
process reproducing a longstanding metaphor about the biological foundations 
of identity. Furthermore, as is so often the case, the fine intentions of official 
documents may exist in the statute books without being put into practice 
in everyday life. Between 2012 and 2016, for example, only one person was 
convicted under the anti-discrimination law, although 873 cases were brought. 
Most of the material pertaining to the Afro Decade campaign on the ministry 
of the interior’s website is cut and pasted from UN documents, as the site itself 
acknowledges. When it comes to the specific contribution of the state to this 
process, we are simply informed that the Santos administration’s development 
plan, based on the three pillars of peace, equity and education, will ‘obviously’ 
help all Colombians, since it has a multi-ethnic focus (DACN, 2015). In fact, 
it seems that the relationship between institutions and the ethnic minority 
population is often characterised by co-option and tokenism, as Afrocolombians 
and indigenous people remain underrepresented in Congress. Meanwhile those 
who have taken over ministerial portfolios have done so in areas that fit existing 
stereotypes about ethnic minorities, such as culture and the environment. Most 
importantly, by every available indicator these communities live shorter and 
more impoverished lives, receive worse public services, are offered poorer quality 
education and health care, and have provided a disproportionate number of 
victims of the violent encounters that have come to be known simply as the 
armed conflict.
The chasm between these social realities and the official adoption of 
an explicitly anti-racist stance invites us to explore the latter’s role in the 
reproduction and contestation of power in one of the most unequal states in 
the most unequal region of the world. After all, the New Granadan social order, 
whose legacy continues to haunt contemporary Colombia, was founded on a 
hierarchy of difference that is now understood through the lens of race and 
ethnicity. For all that Malcolm Deas (1997, p. 358) notes that mid 19th century 
Colombia was ‘in many respects […] a more mobile, freer, less caste-bound, 
less deferential, more democratic society than its neighbours’, the fact remains 
that the abject poverty that marked the lives of most of the million inhabitants 
of Nueva Granada at the time of independence, in stark contrast to the leisured 
classes, had not been alleviated at the turn of the 20th century. Colombia, its 
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population then four million, remained one of the poorest and most unequal 
countries in the hemisphere. In spite of the economic lift-off of the 1920s and 
30s, and the emergence of a middle class as a result of the increasing prosperity 
of the country from mid-century on, this fundamental inequality has not 
been overcome in two hundred years of republican history. While there was a 
modest redistribution of resources between the 1960s and the early 1980s, the 
advent of neoliberal economic policies put paid to Colombia’s nascent welfare 
state in the 90s. World Bank figures for 2014 suggested Colombia had a GINI 
of over 53, rising to a staggering 86 in rural areas, putting it ahead of Brazil, 
Paraguay and Honduras in terms of inequality (World Bank, 2014; UNDP, 
2011). Other estimates vary but, by any measure, Colombia’s disparities in 
income and access to resources remain extraordinarily large.
Given that anti-racism sets out to combat the effects of particular historic 
forms of inequality, to talk about this struggle without considering the broader 
picture of inequality in the country is to miss an important point, as if the 
social order experienced by the mestizo majority were somehow fundamentally 
democratic and just. Furthermore, the prejudices associated with racism are 
not confined to attitudes to those who are identified as part of the black and 
indigenous populations, but permeate society as a whole. Indigenous-looking 
and dark-skinned mestizos still experience discrimination, and the imbrication 
in the social imaginary of notions of race and class continues to legitimise both 
racism and elitism. Combatting racism, in other words, is not simply a matter 
of integrating previously marginalised populations into a prevailing democratic 
order, but of challenging the sedimented history of inequality that continues 
to structure the contemporary political scene. In this respect, Paschel (2016a, 
p. 50) is right to note that anti-racist mobilisation may ‘take multiple forms’, 
singling out intellectuals, political leaders and activists like the Afrocuban 
Rafael Serra and the Afrocolombian Diego Luis Córdoba, ‘who organized 
around regional identity and under a socialist platform’.
This is not to say that struggles over ethnicity should be abandoned in 
favour of class. On the contrary, my contention is that notions of race and class 
cannot properly be separated in the Colombian context. The left’s failure to take 
ethnicity properly into account revealed a political blind spot, as revolutionary 
movements took for granted a vision of the mestizo nation that ignored the 
specificity of racial discrimination. All forms of politics are in a sense forms of 
identity politics, in that, rather than representing stable pre-constituted social 
phenomena, identities are articulated, claimed, and further developed through 
conflict. However, just as in the case of class, an emphasis on ethnicity to the 
exclusion of other factors is likely to obscure other patterns of dominance and 
subordination. In what follows, therefore, I focus on the case of Afrocolombians 
in order to consider the influence of the official recognition and condemnation 
of discrimination on recent political struggles in Colombia. In particular, the 
questions of the role current institutional arrangements envisage within the 
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political system for ethnic minorities, of how these groups are constituted 
as political subjects, and how their relationship not only with the state but 
with other social actors has developed since 1991, are of crucial importance 
in contemporary political conflicts. The case studies that make up the second 
part of this chapter therefore, centre on how afrocolombianidad is constructed 
as a political identity in specific contexts, and in particular considers its role in 
attempts to construct a counterhegemonic movement capable of challenging 
the deep-seated inequalities that continue to shape everyday life.
Gramscian hegemony and identity politics 
The framing of these questions places them within the general idiom of 
Gramscian hegemony theory, which will provide the overarching conceptual 
point of reference here, though it will not be taken as a precise model to be 
followed. As has often been pointed out, Gramsci’s approach was very much 
an ad hoc one, and the many insights that can be gleaned from the hundreds 
of pages of notes written in Mussolini’s jails do not represent a complete 
conceptual system. What Gramscian thinking does allow, however, is an 
approach that emphasises the multiplicity of factors through which modern 
societies have come to be, as Hall (1980) put it, structured in dominance, 
and the heterogeneous nature of both elite and subaltern groups, who forge 
their identities through struggle. It emphasises the importance of violence in 
the reproduction of power, a point often underplayed in understandings of 
Gramsci that focus on the role of consent, but which has a particular resonance 
in the Colombian context. It also concerns itself with the cultural dimension 
of power, whose importance is evident in the way social relationships become 
naturalised through forms of ‘common sense’ that contain the seeds of 
resistance, or as Gramsci (1971, p. 627) puts it, ‘prejudices from all past phases 
of history ... and intuitions of a future philosophy’. In the process, it captures 
the fragmented, incomplete, and often contradictory nature of social being.
Colombia offers an intriguing case study for hegemony theory and the role of 
identity politics. Some might claim that the country’s turbulent history is proof 
of a failure of hegemony, and therefore of the state’s lack of legitimacy. Yet the 
stability of the country’s social structure, which has been capable of tolerating 
relatively high levels of political violence, shows that in spite of the problems 
of legitimacy faced by the state, the reproduction of power and privilege has 
nonetheless been secured. The Gramscian concept that best captures, perhaps, 
Colombian politics over the turn of the century is ‘passive revolution’ (p. 288). 
This term refers to periods in which the alliance of groups that dominates a 
given polity faces a crisis. A passive revolution provides a temporary fix for the 
crisis by initiating change without substantially threatening the interests of the 
alliance of groups that exerts leadership in a particular social formation. In the 
Colombian case, the crisis was posed by the need to dismantle the last vestiges 
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of the import substitution model, already largely abandoned in the 80s, and 
reposition the Colombian economy within corporate globalisation. The fix 
came through the promotion of extractive industry, industrial agribusiness, and 
the provision of services, particularly in the financial sector. In short, the passive 
revolution under way since the late 80s has effected a significant transformation 
of the local political economy without confronting the problem of inequality. 
The current negotiated surrender of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of 
Colombia (FARC) can be thought of as a part of this ongoing process, offering 
as it does enormous opportunities for a deepening of a neoliberal development 
model while posing real perils for popular movements.
This notion also affords insights into the constitution of 1991, which is 
seen as a milestone for its construction of a political and legal framework that 
institutionalises a form of multiculturalism, partly in terms of recognition and 
partly in terms of redistribution (Fraser, 1995). In spite of its limitations and 
ambiguities, it is generally interpreted as a progressive document that seeks to 
effect a shift in the status of historically excluded groups. Over the last decade 
a sector of the Colombian political class, essentially those groups supporting 
ex-president Alvaro Uribe, has been at war with a constitutional settlement 
perceived as too liberal, too permissive and too democratic. However, the 
constitution has long been the object of vigorous attacks from the left, who 
have criticised it as a neoliberalising document that paved the way for the 
privatisation of parts of the Colombian state, in a process described by Harvey 
(2004) as accumulation through dispossession. In the words of Mejía (2007, p. 
236, my translation), ‘Colombia’s elites managed […] through the imposition 
of a neoliberal model of development, to constitutionalise lies and cloak their 
historic strategy of domination in the seductive clothing of the social state of 
law and participatory democracy’.
The expansion of participatory programmes and the recognition of 
Afrocolombian and indigenous rights, therefore, need to be understood in the 
context of the neoliberalisation of the economy and the refusal of traditional 
elites to relinquish their privileges. This restructuring was not simply an elite 
conspiracy, imposed from above, but part of a series of struggles that have 
shaped a political scene which is not exactly what any group would have chosen, 
but which consistently favours the interests of a dominant bloc. As Mejía 
(2007, p. 236) notes, social democratic, multicultural, and neoliberal currents 
all coexist within the final document, the product of negotiations between very 
different political constituencies that included the Liberal party, the recently 
demobilised guerrillas of M-19, and Álvaro Gómez’s right-wing Movement 
for National Salvation. Among its progressive features are the special rights 
afforded to what it designates as black and indigenous communities, offering 
them relative autonomy within territorial boundaries recognised by the state. 
These institutional shifts represent a significant break with the history of 
Colombian constitutionalism. Hitherto, republican appeals to citizenship and 
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equality before the law helped to legitimise a national ideal of mestizaje that 
denied racism in the name of mixing, while continuing to discriminate not 
only against Afrocolombian and indigenous Colombians but also dark-skinned 
mestizos, whose features too clearly betrayed their proximity to the less favoured 
sources of race mixture. The constitutional protection of property and privilege 
discriminated against precisely these social identities, overrepresented among 
the poor. Indeed, the racism that characterises Colombian society is dependent 
on the reproduction of a particular kind of inequality that continues to stratify 
the nation in socioracial terms. In this respect, rather than accepting that, as 
Paschel (2016a, p. 47) puts it, ‘class inequalities were arguably more salient 
than racial inequalities in the everyday lives of ordinary people’, it should be 
argued that forms of discrimination based on race and class were mutually 
reinforcing to the extent that they were impossible to separate, even though 
neither is reducible to the other. In short, racism and elitism went hand in 
hand, as they do to this day, and it is this nexus, inherently racist in spite of its 
ambiguities, that was implicitly rejected by the constitutional recognition of 
minority rights.
A key aspect of the shift was the constitutional granting of special legal 
privileges on the basis of bound serialities. The distinction between bound 
and unbound serialities comes from the work of Benedict Anderson and 
Partha Chatterjee, who use the notion to distinguish between collective 
identities that are voluntarily adopted and those that are imposed by others. 
For Anderson (1998, p. 117), unbound serialities are those forms of collective 
identity that are open to all, ‘such open-to-the-world plurals as nationalists, 
anarchists, bureaucrats, and workers’, whereas bound serialities refer to 
identities whose membership is limited by categories such as race or ethnicity. 
From this perspective, unbound categories such as citizenship are potentially 
liberating, whereas bound serialities are understood as backward-looking 
and fundamentally exclusive, out of step with the universalising vision of a 
democratic politics. Furthermore, he is suspicious of attempts to divide the 
social field in this manner, as they allow the state to impose categories that 
allow it to control and manage populations.
Chatterjee, in contrast, sees bound serialities as a fact of political life – in 
some respects as the fact of political life – as the institutions of the state engage 
with populations divided into specific demographics. Borrowing a notion 
of Foucault’s, both Anderson and Chatterjee contrast the universal ideals of 
democratic politics with governmentality. For his part, Chatterjee (2004, p. 
4) identifies ‘a conflict that lies at the heart of modern politics in most of the 
world’, namely 
the opposition between the universal ideal of civic nationalism, based on 
individual freedoms and equal rights irrespective of distinctions of religion, 
race, language, or culture, and the particular demands of cultural identity, 
which call for the differential treatment of particular groups on grounds 
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of vulnerability or backwardness or historical injustice, or indeed for 
numerous other reasons.
This opposition, furthermore, ‘is symptomatic of the transition that occurred 
in modern politics […] from a conception of democratic politics grounded in 
the idea of popular sovereignty to one in which democratic politics is shaped 
by governmentality’ (p. 4). In a further contrast to Anderson, Chatterjee 
sees the terrain of governmentality, marked by a specific set of relationships 
between institutions and ‘populations’, as the most significant space of popular 
politics, as opposed to the mechanisms of representative democracy that are 
the preserve of civil society which, in a return to Marx, he sees as ‘the closed 
association of modern elite groups, sequestered from the wider popular life of 
the communities, walled up within enclaves of civic freedom and rational law’ 
(p. 4).
As James Clifford (1998, p. 364) notes with regard to Anderson, this 
binary opposition tends to oversimplify the political field and risks freezing 
‘a moralized binary’, and a similar critique might be made of Chatterjee’s 
inversion of Anderson’s position. However, the debate resonates in the 
Colombian context, not least because it captures something of what is at stake 
in the development of political identities. The allocation of specific rights to 
members of certain bound serialities introduced a new level of complexity 
into the country’s politico-juridical structure, envisaged, in the manner 
described by Chatterjee, as a form of historic reparation. Afrocolombian and 
indigenous communities were guaranteed some measure of representation in 
Congress and limited autonomy in the territorially bounded communities 
recognised by the state. These communities received recognition and a 
degree of redistribution, while simultaneously being treated as a supplement, 
a historic remnant best dealt with in isolation. While special measures were 
envisaged for ethnic communities, a broader emphasis on participation sought 
to open the political process up to a more engaged citizenry. Thus, both the 
universalising possibilities invoked by unbound serialities and the dynamics of 
population classification and management present in their bound counterparts 
are apparent in the constitution. With regard to the former, the rhetoric of 
participation has proliferated in dozens of polities around the globe in the last 
fifty years but it has a specific history in Colombia, where the closed nature of 
the political system, particularly in the National Front period (1958–74), was 
frequently invoked by left-wing insurgencies as a justification for taking up 
arms. The constitutional settlement of 1991, therefore, sought to open up the 
democratic process, allowing a voice to all in ‘the decisions that affect them’, 
as article two proclaims. The constitutional emphasis on participation justified 
the development in the following years of a myriad of participatory spaces 
within the Colombian polity. However, these were overwhelmingly devoted to 
processes of popular consultation at a local level. Expressions of participatory 
democracy with genuine decisive power, such as participatory budgeting, have 
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been confined in the main to a few timid experiments in some of the country’s 
major cities. 
It is striking, however, that programmes supposedly aimed at all citizens 
have generally been perceived in terms of bound serialities, though not 
those outlined in the constitution. Just as ‘black’ or indigenous populations 
were regarded as special cases, participatory programmes were targeted at 
marginalised communities, rather than the population as a whole. The 
word comunidad, so often invoked in these contexts, in practice designates 
vulnerable, territorially defined communities, whose influence on the 
national scene has historically been limited. Participation, in other words, has 
always been aimed at precise populations, identified by the state as victims 
of historic marginalisation, including, in the Bolivarian idiom, not only 
Afrocolombians and indigenous communities but ‘the poor of all colours’. 
To borrow Chatterjee’s frame of reference, it is one of the two main forms 
of engagement between the populations and the world of politics (the other 
being clientelism). Furthermore, the practical experience of participation 
in Colombia has more to do with governmentality than democracy, as local 
administrations have incorporated the notion into their practice across a broad 
range of dependencies. Contrary to the spirit of the constitution, vulnerable 
communities – often places where Afrocolombian and indigenous-looking 
people are overrepresented – have found it difficult to turn these relationships 
into an exercise in engaged citizenship. Instead, participatory programmes have 
represented a means for institutions to manage the demands and expectations 
of a categorised and classified population, while simultaneously legitimising 
their own systems of governance.
Beyond the political and juridical provisions of the new settlement, 
the promises of inclusion appeared in a fractured and sometimes violent 
political landscape. Passive revolutions are often accompanied by violence, 
and Colombia has been no exception. In the post-1991 period, just as land-
titling for minority communities was taking place, an alliance between global 
corporate interests and local clientelistic networks deployed both paramilitary 
and state violence in order to carry out the greatest agrarian counter-reform 
in Colombian history. This simultaneously furthered a development model 
based on extractive industry and the promotion of industrial agribusiness, a 
process that has been going on throughout the global south. These groups, 
particularly powerful in the regions, are strongly represented in Congress, and 
have captured many branches of Colombia’s hybrid state (López, 2010). In the 
words of Machado et al. (2017, p. 1075), the result is 
a paradoxical context where on one hand the country’s ethnic and cultural 
diversity are recognised and, on the other, the imposition of an extractive 
economic model continues to cause displacement and devastating 
environmental conflicts, forcing communities to constantly defend their 
territories, rights, cosmovisiones [worldviews], and lifeways.
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This is the broad political context which frames attempts to understand 
the place of institutional anti-racism and Afrocolombian activism in the 
struggle for equality. What, then, is the role of identity politics in the attempt 
to counter the ongoing top-down transformation of Colombian society? In 
order to explore this question, I want to consider three specific cases. My 
involvement with each took place during an extended period of fieldwork 
in Quibdó, the departmental capital of Chocó, where I was researching the 
municipal administration’s attempts to forge a political alliance with urban 
communities that were mainly but not exclusively Afrocolombian. During this 
study of the relationship between the municipality and vulnerable communities 
in Quibdó’s Comuna Dos [Second District], my focus was not the notion 
of afrocolombianidad, nor in fact Afrocolombian rights, but on problems of 
participation more generally in an urban area where specific differential rights 
did not apply. In the process, however, I was able to consider the way that 
ethnicity was constructed in a document outlining the political programme 
proposed by the local administration, and I will start with a brief discussion of 
how this document sets out to construct a unified political subject. Following 
this, I will refer to two specific events, the First Congress of the Pueblo Negro, 
Afrocolombiano, Palenquero and Raizal, held in Quibdó in August 2013, and 
the Cumbre Agraria, held in Bogotá in March 2014. 
The Quibdó MIA development plan 
Quibdó has in many respects been a symbol of poverty and the failure of the 
central state in its treatment of Afrocolombians. Unlike the rest of the Pacific 
lowlands, where the littoral is an adjunct of administrative centres located 
on the other side of the western cordillera, Chocó is at least nominally self-
governing, having become a department in 1947, and being governed by a 
local Afrocolombian political class. This has allowed politicians and the media 
in the metropolitan centres to tap into the racist imaginary by claiming that 
the problems of the department are the result of local corruption, as if the 
scandals that periodically rock the rest of the country were mere figments of the 
imagination. In 2012, however, a new administration took over the running 
of the municipality, and promised to do politics differently. The programme 
of new mayor Zulia Mena, whose own political capital had been accrued 
through a long history of Afrocolombian activism, offered participation 
for the most marginalised sectors of the population in the construction 
and execution of a programme that would prioritise the needs of the most 
vulnerable in a city where over 80 per cent of the population have unsatisfied 
basic needs. Crowded with refugees from paramilitary offensives in the rest of 
the department, whose arrival put an increasing burden on already deficient 
public services, and surrounded by rivers contaminated by illegal gold mining, 
Quibdó was a challenging political context in which to promote participation. 
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Intriguingly, however, the new administration was also the first to foreground 
the identitarian tropes associated with the institutionalisation of a discourse of 
afrocolombianidad.
The Mena administration’s development plan, Quibdó MIA, articulates a 
complex and contradictory political subject. Unusually for documents of 
this sort, it sets out a historical context, noting that centuries of exploitation, 
impoverishment and lack of opportunity have left the Afrochocoan population 
in a state of near ‘mental incapacity’ (Mena, 2012, p. 16), though there is no 
corresponding reference to the plight of indigenous communities. The cause 
of this suffering is identified as the ‘absentee-extractivist economic model’ (p. 
16), in the ascendant during the institution of slavery, that expropriates local 
resources leaving nothing behind. The programme proposes to counter this 
historical dispossession by turning Quibdó into ‘a world capital of biodiversity’ 
(p. 12). At the same time, it promises to end corruption as ‘the mechanism for 
achieving individual and collective interests’ (p. 18), and ‘diminish the traps of 
poverty’ (p. 13).
The political subject that underpins this plan is the ‘MIA’ (mestizo, 
indigenous, Afrocolombian) of the programme’s title, referred to at times as 
a ‘multi-ethnic people’, a term that foregrounds popular sovereignty while 
recognising the bound serialities that come into play in a municipality whose 
rural area includes collectively titled lands administered by Afrocolombian 
community councils and indigenous cabildos [traditional authorities]. Even 
when referring to the urban area, however, where no such special rights prevail, 
there is a tension in the document between the desire to produce a unified 
popular subject and the assertion of ethnic difference, apparent through the 
use of the word ‘imaginary’, which at various points in the text stands in for 
the notion of culture. Thus, the document sees its collective subject ‘originating 
in the acceptance, integration and harmonization of the three existing ethnic 
imaginaries […] and their achievements as ethnicities in the unique and 
logical construction of an idea of development that will make possible the bio-
psycho-social wellbeing of the population’. Part of this process is the struggle to 
‘position eco-values and identity founded on spiritual beliefs as the means for 
constructing a just, peaceful, harmonious and united society, rich in morality’ 
(pp. 15, 25).
The focus on traditional values in the pursuit of prosperity sounds somewhat 
in keeping with the ‘utopian thinking’ researcher-activist Ulrich Oslender 
(2016, p. 218) regards as necessary in the Pacific region, the more so because 
his citation of Lefebvre brings to mind the latter’s work on the city. Unlike the 
cases imagined by Oslender, however, the document’s invocation of its collective 
political subject suggests the problems inherent in the institutionalisation of 
identity politics within the Colombian political scene. In an environment 
where being afrocolombiano rather than mestizo is the norm, it reproduces 
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the multiculturalism of the constitution by seeking to create a united popular 
subject, while simultaneously appealing to bound serialities. 
The emphasis on cultural identity, however, blurs the distinction between 
bound and unbound forms of groupness, in the process removing much of the 
politics from the text. The solution to the problems of the region is presented as 
lying in the cultural values of its inhabitants. Furthermore, the presentation of 
the ethnic identity of an emergent collective subject as a political solution in its 
own right avoids engagement with the contemporary political economy of the 
department. The brief history of Afrochocoans, with its dependency-theory-
infused critique of extractivism, confronts the political economy responsible 
for the vast inequalities that shape daily life in the department. Yet it also 
consigns the worst effects of exploitation to the past. The responsibility for 
the poverty of the department is assigned to the absentee white or mestizo 
proprietors and landowners of the past, rather than the current mestizo 
population, regional elites, or even the central government, which the 
administration claims to represent. Indeed, as far as the future is concerned, the 
document echoes the discourse of neoliberal competitiveness and comparative 
advantage that underpins the state-sponsored model of development, with its 
promises of securing outsourced contracts – ‘procesos de tercerización, de off 
shore, de maquila’ [processes of sub-contracting, off-shoring and assembly-
line production] (Mena, 2012, p. 57). This aside, the commodification of 
the environment and the attitudes to it of local communities is presented 
as the only hope for a better life, a decidedly forlorn one at that, given the 
administration’s 19th-century obsession with the ‘locomotives of progress’. For 
all the talk of poverty, injustice and corruption, the document exemplifies how 
ethnic identity politics can be absorbed within institutional structures in ways 
that remain perfectly functional to Colombia’s ongoing passive revolution. The 
invocation of identity politics in this context, therefore, serves to legitimise 
the goals of a particular set of political entrepreneurs rather than express the 
demands of a social movement. Some community organisers saw it as a kind of 
political ventriloquism, in which the architects of Quibdó MIA simultaneously 
interpellated the population and claimed to speak for it. In the parts of the 
city where we worked there was little appetite for identitarian discourse as a 
mobilising factor, partly because to claim afrocolombianidad or indigeneity 
brought no special benefits in the urban setting, but also because so little was 
offered in practical terms.
The First Congress of the Pueblo Negro
The complexities surrounding the constitution of a political subject were 
apparent on a larger stage in the Primer Congreso Nacional del Pueblo Negro, 
Afrocolombiano, Palenquero y Raizal in 2013, an event partly scheduled to 
take stock of the impact of law 70, 20 years after its implementation. The 
This content downloaded from 128.240.225.52 on Wed, 04 Mar 2020 13:22:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
THE ANTINOMIES OF IDENTITY POLITICS 37
activists of the organising committee were well aware of the pitfalls involved in 
the attempt to construct a specifically Afrocolombian political subject, capable 
of setting a collective agenda, mobilising support, and applying pressure on the 
state to achieve its goals. The division between bound and unbound serialities 
once again provides insights into the challenges they faced. The cumbersome 
title of the congress is suggestive of what is at stake in the struggles over naming 
that have taken place within Afrocolombian social movements. The key concept 
is that of the people, introducing the idea of popular sovereignty, but this 
universal political subject is immediately bound, first by the term ‘negro’ [black], 
and then by ‘afrocolombiano’. The first of these might be taken as a simple 
reference to phenotype but it is in fact a highly loaded term, steeped in the long 
history of racism in Colombia. The tension between the two terms is in part 
a result of the disagreement between those who reject ‘negro’ as irredeemably 
derogatory and therefore racist and those who see it as an expression of identity 
that can be reclaimed from its discriminatory connotations. The former prefer 
to emphasise the importance of shared ancestry through the use of the term 
‘afrocolombiano’, presented as the key factor in the definition of this collective 
subject. As the National Conference of Afrocolombian Organisations (CNOA, 
n.d.) puts it, ‘we consider the Afrocolombian people to be constituted by 
women and men descended from Africans born in Colombia’. 
This nomenclature too is tied to the ways in which the state has allotted 
specific rights to officially recognised ethnic groups. Thus, to self-identify 
as negro can be either a generic or a highly specific act. It is the term the 
mestizo majority imposes on people with a particular phenotype throughout 
the country, but it is also a common form of self-identification among 
Afrocolombians. Most people in Quibdó, for example, identify as negro. On the 
other hand, when hitched to the territorially defined notion of ‘community’, 
negro is a constitutionally recognised ethnicity affording specific rights. As a 
result of demands from activists, both palenqueros, descendants of a small but 
culturally significant maroon community not far from Cartagena, and raizales, 
speakers of an English-based creole in the Caribbean islands of San Andrés and 
Providencia, are identities recognised by legislation (specifically article 310 of 
the constitution for raizales; decree 4181 of 2007 and decree 2163 of 2012 for 
both raizales and palenqueros). Unlike the generic notion of blackness, which 
could be applied to or be claimed by any black citizen without affording any 
particular rights, each is both culturally and territorially bound. Both negro and 
afrocolombiano can be applied to these groups, though the latter’s identification 
with the English-speaking Caribbean makes the nationalising aspect of the word 
afrocolombiano problematic. The deliberate use of each of these terms, then, 
was a highly politicised choice, simultaneously recognising the heterogeneity of 
blackness within Colombia, declaring unity within difference, and advancing 
political claims within the juridical framework of the state.
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The Congress was envisaged as a space in which Afrocolombian organisations 
would refine their goals and clarify their dealings with the state. In fact, some 
quibdoseños suggested that this was a gathering of all those who position 
themselves as interlocutors of the state, as representatives and community 
leaders, to be sure, but above all as brokers. As in the case of Quibdó MIA, 
some people felt that these actors appropriated the voice of the black or 
Afrocolombian population, excluding absent perspectives, in the pursuit 
of personal advancement. This was in many ways an unfair claim because 
alongside the traffickers of influence were many activists with a long trajectory 
in the struggle for Afrocolombian rights. If things had been otherwise, the event 
would never have taken place, as the process of canvassing opinion, compiling 
the agenda, and organising transport and accommodation was dependent on a 
reservoir of good will. 
At the same time, this critique recognised both the partially co-opted nature 
of these spaces, and the lack of participation of most of the community, a 
problem not exclusive to ethnic minorities. It also reminds us, as Paschel (2016a, 
p.3) notes, that while Afrocolombian organisations in Colombia ‘were essential 
to the making of black political subjects’ they were ‘small and under-resourced 
networks of activists […] with few political allies, unpopular with, and largely 
unknown to, the masses’. Grass-roots scepticism about the movement – echoed 
by activists who occasionally wondered whether it made sense to talk about a 
movement – was clear in a sarcastic remark made by a Quibdó woman: ‘I hear 
they brought a thousand negros to Quibdó for this Congress – why did they 
do that when there are already plenty of negros here?’ The provocative use of 
the word negro questions activists’ insistence on the political significance of 
particular forms of nomenclature. Redolent of the commonly held scepticism 
about ‘politics’ in Colombia, such attitudes play a key role in discouraging 
activism and political mobilisation. In the particular case of Afrocolombians, 
they are indicative of the relative weakness of identity politics on the national 
scale, especially when the obvious incentives to mobilise around identity are 
missing. This was particularly true of attempts to foreground urban issues 
such as racism in large cities with mestizo majorities. In these contexts, 
Afrocolombians might be identified as needing representation, but the bound 
seriality of afrocolombianidad brings with it no specific rights. Furthermore, 
from the perspective of Quibdó’s poorest barrios, even struggles against racism 
had little immediate bearing on the lived experience of communities struggling 
for jobs and basic public services in a city where the administration itself was 
Afrocolombian.
The division between different actors struggling for Afrocolombian rights is 
partly due to the relationships constructed through constitutional legislation. 
As Bolívar (2004, p. 17) notes, law 70 did little to establish the mechanisms 
through which Afrocolombian community councils, the organisations 
exercising jurisdiction over collectively titled lands, could interact with each 
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other and with regional society, framing them instead as interlocutors of the 
state. The need to build a cohesive movement was frequently mentioned in 
the Congress. Tensions between activists, however, came to the surface very 
quickly. After the fanfare surrounding the presidential visit, the following 
day’s opening of the Congress for business was a tumultuous affair. Following 
ritual invocations of spiritual and ancestral forces, the start to proceedings 
was delayed by an hour as a delegation from Valle, dominated by powerful 
regional broker Rosa Solís, approached the stage, arguing loudly about the 
order of proceedings, and haranguing the rest of the auditorium. Solís has been 
an influential figure in establishing more than 20 community councils in the 
wake of law 70, and part of a high-level consultancy group with Afrocolombian 
communities set up by the Uribe administration, a group later dissolved by 
order of the constitutional court. A controversial figure, Solís is seen by many 
as the quintessential example of the broker who has made both a name and a 
living as a trusted interlocutor of the state (La Silla Vacía, 2012). 
Similar scenes were repeated on the final day, and were seen by the organisers 
as humiliating for the movement as a whole, and the general conclusions 
drawn up by the CNOA underline the negative effects of competition 
for influence within their organisations, often referred to as the desire for 
‘protagonism’. Under the ‘lessons learned’ section of the Congress proceedings, 
the first three examples of negative practice were ‘the institutionalisation of the 
movement through the strategy of divide and corrupt’, ‘the projection of an 
image of organisational chaos which the State takes advantage of to ignore its 
obligations to the black people’, and the fact that ‘the negro, afrocolombiano, 
raizal and palenquero social movement has no presence in decision-making 
spaces’ (Vivanco and Ramírez, 2014, p. 9). The final point underlined the key 
problem that, as elsewhere in participatory spaces in Colombia, community 
engagement was limited to processes of consultation.
In the case of ethnic communities, however, the legal requirement for 
consultation represented a form of leverage. The question of how to engage with 
the state hinged on a single practical point, the controversial topic of consulta 
previa [prior consultation]. This legal figure, adapted from the International 
Labour Organisation’s convention 169 (1989), was a fundamental feature of 
legislation surrounding the granting of land title, and the main gift of the 
new legislative framework to officially recognised minorities. In effect, it means 
that development affecting collectively held lands has to receive the informed 
consent of the communities concerned before going ahead. What should be 
a political trump card, however, has constantly been undermined through a 
wide range of dubious practices, from official denial of the existence of ethnic 
communities in specific territories to badly managed and unrepresentative 
processes which have rubber-stamped projects with powerful backers in the 
private or public sector. The Congress therefore aimed to produce a set of 
protocols protecting community rights. Furthermore, it was agreed from the 
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outset of the Congress that the list of demands emerging from each of the 
thematic committees was to carry a warning at the top of the page noting that 
the deliberations of these committees were not to be regarded as an exercise 
in prior consultation. From this perspective, the Congress was characterised 
by the failure of the administration’s strategy of flattering the Afrocolombian 
movement for its political significance, while seeking an accommodation that 
would allow it to pursue both its goal of disarming the FARC and furthering 
its development goals.
For activists, the Congress offered an opportunity to build a more 
united movement. In many respects, the rhetoric of solidarity covered up a 
movement dogged by infighting over which sectors, and even which leaders, 
should be regarded as proper interlocutors of the state. In particular, the 
collective recognition of the movement’s own relative weakness led to a simple 
recommendation on the need for solidarity: ‘we need to make statements in 
favour of other social and communitarian movements, because alone we will get 
nowhere’ (Vivanco and Ramírez, 2014, p. 9). There is a clear recognition that 
identity politics alone cannot produce a political subject capable of challenging 
the deepening of Colombia’s passive revolution, a process that more than any 
other threatens the life opportunities of Afrocolombians.
The Cumbre Agraria of 2014
It is precisely this appreciation that led to the participation of ethnic activists 
in the Cumbre Agraria, Campesina, Étnica y Popular (the agrarian, peasant, 
ethnic and popular summit) of 2014. In fact, while the Congress was 
taking place, Colombia was in an almost unprecedented state of turmoil. 
The free trade agreement with the US that had come into law in 2012 
forced agricultural workers to buy US seeds and pay exorbitant prices for 
fertiliser. In a desperate response, peasant organisations, including members 
of indigenous and Afrocolombian communities, blocked major roads in 25 
of the country’s 31 departments, bringing the heavy goods haulage that is 
the lifeblood of Colombian commerce to a grinding halt. President Santos’ 
unfortunate declaration that ‘there is no such agrarian strike’ was belied by 
blocked highways, as the strikers were joined by hauliers protesting at fuel 
prices. Daily images of the activists’ confrontations across blazing barricades 
with the notorious Colombian riot police made news bulletins across the 
country, garnering unprecedented support for their cause among the urban 
population. Even the private media channels, generally hostile to social protest, 
toned down their coverage and presented the strikers in a neutral and at times 
even positive light. For a while, this nascent movement represented the most 
obvious threat to the dominant model of development.
In the face of the government’s failure to respond to the strikers’ demands, 
a meeting of the Cumbre was scheduled to take place in Bogotá in March, 
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2014. A huge organisational effort brought more than 30,000 delegates to 
the Coldeportes coliseum over a rainy March weekend in Bogotá. Here, too, 
the agglutinative title of the event is striking. Clearly aimed at the creation 
of a rural popular front seeking to articulate distinct demands in order to 
create a single, more powerful political actor, such an attempt was particularly 
significant because in the years after 1991 peasant leaders were concerned 
that the ethnicisation of collective land-titling had left mestizo peasants and 
colonists on the agricultural frontier in limbo. Indeed, as Duarte (2015, p. 450) 
notes, one of the effects of the constitution and its attendant ethnic legislation 
was that the mestizo peasant became ‘the bearer of third class rural citizenship 
compared to the ethnic populations’. And as Bolívar (2004, p. 219) notes in 
her comments on Sotomayor’s work in the 90s in Silvia, Cauca, ‘the process 
of constructing a cultural identity and redefining themselves as indigenous has 
led to a cultural “invisibility” of the peasant which […] could be useful to the 
government in neutralizing peasant struggle’.
Indeed, whereas indigenous and Afrocolombian groups tended to be 
presented as guardians of the environment, mestizo colonists were more 
likely to be framed as destructive raspachines [coca growers] and guerrilla 
sympathisers. However, the legal scaffolding established by the constitution, 
with its offer of rights on the basis of bound seriality, led peasants to seek 
recognition as a collective subject in similar terms, with the legislation on 
the establishment of peasant reserve zones being passed a year after law 70. 
It is significant that an element of these claims is the desire to protect peasant 
culture, with the National Association for Peasant Reserve Zones emphasising 
the importance of ‘positioning our cultural identity’ and ensuring ‘the survival 
of our cultural identity’ (Prensa Rural, 2014). This is in itself a hint that the 
state’s recognition of the bound serialities of ethnic minorities has been noted 
by other groups seeking political recognition. It is also a reaction against the 
increased visibility of ethnic communities with a recognised cultural identity, 
and peasant communities whose cultural distinctiveness was ignored. As 
Bolívar rightly suggests, post-1991 legislation ‘inverted the differences, the 
negative representations, and the lack of connection between those groups that 
could be identified as culturally distinct, and the poor mestizos, now devoid of 
support and protection’ (Bolívar, 2004, p. 220). Thus, as Montenegro (2016, 
p. 175) notes, ‘it is not the same to struggle for a piece of land as it is to 
exercise territoriality, understood as the establishment of economic, political 
and cultural relationships in the territory, as well as territorial forms of ordering 
and government’. Furthermore, whereas the state has seen peasant reserve zones 
as areas in which it can strengthen its presence, for the peasant movement the 
political autonomy of the ethnic communities represents a model. Montenegro 
(p. 176) cites Robert Daza, then president of the National Agrarian 
Coordinating Committee (Coordinador Agrario Nacional), who claimed that 
‘while the historic struggle of the peasantry has been for land the scenario of 
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struggle has recently been extended to the defence of and the right to territory’. 
For his part, Andrés Gil, representative of Marcha Patriótica, was even clearer 
in his declaration that ‘we don’t just want land, we want territoriality to carry 
out an exercise in self-government’ (Telesur, 2014). These demands, with their 
denunciation of the multiple threats posed by state promoted megaprojects, 
extractive industry, and agro-industrial monocultures such as oil palm and 
bananas, represent a direct threat to the dominant development model.
Competition between the different ethnic and peasant movements debilitates 
all of them in the face of global capital’s assault on the Colombian countryside. 
Thus, the presence of the Black Communities’ Process (PCN), an organisation 
that has played a key role in struggles of Afrocolombian rights in the southern 
part of the Pacific littoral, and the National Indigenous Organisation of 
Colombia (ONIC) at the summit was a significant strategic departure. This 
was the first time that a unified list of demands had been presented to the 
state by such a broad range of organisations. At this moment of solidarity, 
however, another concern weighed on the minds of delegates. If the Congreso 
Afrocolombiano had focused on prior consultation and its relationship to the 
state, the Cumbre was haunted by the peace negotiations in Havana, and the 
widely shared sense that the movement’s demands were not being represented. 
The constant demand for ‘peace with social justice’, repeated in committee 
after committee like a political incantation, suggested a deep anxiety about 
the post-accord world. Given that radical structural reforms likely to challenge 
privilege were absent from the agreements, social justice still had to be fought 
for.
Though it would be naive to imagine that the social movements involved 
in these struggles had no channels of communication with the FARC and the 
National Liberation Army (ELN), the relationship was more problematic in 
the case of ethnic organisations. The notion that the guerrilla groups have 
always existed in a predatory relationship with traditional authorities is an 
exaggeration, increasingly apparent in the wake of the FARC’s disarmament, as 
extractive industry and logging have gone into overdrive in the power vacuum 
left by the insurgents. Even so, if the peasant movement felt marginalised by its 
lack of constitutional recognition, ethnic movements have long had a fraught 
relationship with the armed left and, indeed, with the left in general, which 
tended to deny the specificity of ethnic struggles not only by focusing strongly 
on class but by unreflectingly repeating the nostrums of nation-building 
mestizaje (Arocha, 1998; Bolívar, 2004, p. 220). In recent times, the presence 
of armed actors in collectively held ethnic territories has had an ambiguous 
effect, at best. 
If any more proof were needed, the negotiations in Havana, haggling 
over the details of the insurgency’s defeat, were taking place without the 
participation of ethnic communities. This absence was also a significant 
indicator of the priorities adopted by the Santos administration. At the 2013 
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Congress, the Afrocolombian movement established a body, the Autoridad 
Nacional Afrocolombiana [National Afrocolombian Authority], precisely in 
order to establish a channel of communication with the negotiators in Havana. 
These efforts were initially ignored or rebuffed and the ethnic chapter of the 
Havana peace accords of 2016, currently being discussed by communities 
across Colombia, was very much an afterthought. It was only 12 hours before 
the presentation of the final document that an addition to the sixth chapter 
of the agreement was approved, establishing an ‘ethnic focus’ (similar to the 
‘gender focus’ that runs throughout the document) during the implementation 
of the accords, essentially a recognition by both the state and the insurgency 
that the rights associated with ethnic difference would be respected in the post-
accord world. What is striking in this case is that ethnic identity politics should 
be so low on the agenda for both the state and the FARC. 
In spite of these doubts, the march from the coliseum to the symbolic seat 
of national government in the Plaza Bolívar was an expression of a utopian 
dreaming, not least because of the crowds warmly applauding the march. 
Briefly, it was as if the Uribe years, marked by what Eduardo Restrepo 
(personal communication, 2004) once described as the ‘paramilitarisation of 
the Colombian mentality’, no longer had any purchase on the imagination. 
Writing two years after the Cumbre, José Santos of the PCN (2016, p. 88)
argued for a utopian solution to the national conflict ‘through the construction 
of an intercultural territory, which respects the territorial structures of each 
of the peoples, united in a single entity. All under the same umbrella, which 
we could call the United Interethnic Territory of Colombia’. This dream, 
however, is unlikely to be realised. As Santos’s text was being published, the 
leadership committee wrote to the president of the republic, denouncing ‘the 
systematic strategy of delay and attrition […] on the part of the government’s 
delegation’, and the fact that ‘there are no effective results that demonstrate your 
government’s supposed political will to peace’ (Desde Abajo, 2016). Worse still, 
the social movements proposing an alternative vision to the model were paying 
a high price. In March 2017, delegates of the Cumbre occupied the buildings of 
the Ministry of the Interior to protest at the murder of activists in the peasant, 
Afrocolombian and indigenous movements. By their own reckoning, 120 had 
been killed in just over 14 months. This particular struggle against the model 
is being lost in a bloody fashion, and at the time of writing there is no end in 
sight for the violence. As a result, Colombia’s passive revolution shows no sign 
of being challenged in the short term.
Conclusion
The official promotion of identity politics in Colombia contains a fundamentally 
contradictory idea, namely that the inclusion of Afrocolombians and indigenous 
groups is possible without a radical restructuring of the distribution of wealth 
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and power. Indeed, the very notion of inclusion becomes untenable, as in order 
to be able to contemplate an end to racism and the elitism that goes with it, 
the very entity comprising these groups would have to be transformed into 
something radically different. The granting of rights on the basis of bound 
serialities, whether these are based on race, ethnicity, territory, or a mixture 
of all three, apparently engages with indigenous and black Colombians while 
banishing them to the margins, to places where they are out of sight and out 
of mind for the urban majority. Yet these groups are not safe, even where they 
‘belong’, because those territories that were deemed baldíos [public lands], 
empty and unclaimed, turned out to be places that dominant groups had plans 
for after all. 
Needless to say, the public expressions of anti-racism found so frequently in 
the media are never linked to this perspective. It is not uncommon for the news 
bulletins to include a three-minute news item on an Afrocolombian woman 
being denied service in a bar, while the murder of representatives of black and 
indigenous communities goes unremarked. The most that can be expected 
is that such occurrences are reported on as random events, inexplicable 
tragedies, as resistant to explanation as a hurricane or an earthquake. There 
are, it seems, acceptable and unacceptable forms of identity politics, and 
those that seek common cause with others in the struggle against Colombia’s 
entrenched inequality are too challenging to be allowed a voice within a 
national conversation managed by Bogotá-based media companies, owned by 
the conglomerates that drive economic policy.
Gramscian perspectives are often praised for their subtlety. In this study, 
however, I have used the notion of passive revolution bluntly, partly to provoke 
and partly to underline the gravity of the present conjuncture. Of course, as 
Restrepo (2013, p. 15) notes, the state is not a monolithic entity against which 
all struggle can be measured, something that a detailed Gramscian analysis would 
emphasise. The same can be said for neoliberalism. And, as Oslender (2016) and 
others have shown convincingly, people do find spaces for struggle, even within 
the neoliberal horizon, winning breathing spaces and small victories for their 
communities. But Gramsci’s work reminds us that ‘in its contradictory structure, 
[the state] condenses a variety of different relations and practices into a definite 
“system of rule”’ (Hall, 1986, p. 18). Identity politics is part of this regime and 
tends to be functional to it, as much by accident as by design. Gramsci’s thinking 
underlines that all hegemonic projects have their day, but his emphasis on the 
need to apply an unshrinking ‘pessimism of the intellect’ to political analysis 
warns against an excessive faith in emancipatory processes. With this in mind, 
the notion of passive revolution reminds us that the struggle against entrenched 
privilege in a country as unequal as Colombia is likely to be long and difficult. 
Local elites have historically proved adept at reshaping institutional arrangements 
in their favour and the current conjuncture suggests that social movements will 
continue to face very testing times in the years to come.
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